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We outline a method to provide advice on optimal mone-
tary policy while taking policymakers’ judgment into account.
The method constructs optimal policy projections (OPPs) by
extracting the judgment terms that allow a model, such as
the Federal Reserve Board staﬀ economic model, FRB/US, to
reproduce a forecast, such as the Greenbook forecast. Given
an intertemporal loss function that represents monetary policy
objectives, OPPs are the projections—of target variables, in-
struments, and other variables of interest—that minimize that
loss function for given judgment terms. The method is illus-
trated by revisiting the economy of early 1997 as seen in the
Greenbook forecasts of February 1997 and November 1999. In
both cases, we use the vintage of the FRB/US model that
was in place at that time. These two particular forecasts were
chosen, in part, because they were at the beginning and the
peak, respectively, of the late 1990s boom period. As such,
they diﬀer markedly in their implied judgments of the state of
the world in 1997 and our OPPs illustrate this diﬀerence. For
a conventional loss function, our OPPs provide signiﬁcantly
better performance than Taylor-rule simulations.
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Policy . . .depends on forecasts of probabilities developed
from large macromodels, numerous submodels, and judg-
ments based on less mathematically precise regimens.
Such judgments, by their nature, are based on bits and
pieces of history that cannot formally be associated with
an analysis of variance. Yet there is information in those
bits and pieces. (Greenspan 2004, 39)
There has long been a gulf between advice on monetary policy
conduct, as gleaned from the academic literature, and the practice
of monetary policy, as captured, for example, in the historical record
of the U.S. Federal Reserve System. Academic treatments of mon-
etary policy have tended to stress commitment to ﬁxed monetary
policy rules and the forbearance of discretion. To many academics,
the conduct of monetary policy is, or should be, a largely mechani-
cal exercise. Descriptions of the practice of monetary policy, on the
other hand, have focused on the accumulation of experience by poli-
cymakers and the application of judgment based on that experience,
as the above quotation from the Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System attests. Meaningful dialogue between
the two camps has been hindered in the past by the absence of a
structure within which the application of judgment can be applied.
The Federal Reserve staﬀ recently began reporting to the Federal
Reserve Board and the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
what we will call optimal policy projections (OPPs) (although they
were not referred to by that name by the Federal Reserve staﬀ).1 The
method of OPPs is a method to present options on optimal mone-
tary policy while taking into account the judgment of policymakers
or, as in the case of the Federal Reserve Board, that of the staﬀ.
It was implemented in June 2001 by Robert Tetlow using a mostly
backward-looking variant of the Federal Reserve Board’s FRB/US
1The staﬀ of the Federal Reserve Board prepare for members of the FOMC
an oﬃcial Greenbook forecast (with a green cover) for each of the eight FOMC
meetings per year. It also contains analysis of recent incoming data, an assess-
ment of the state of the economy, and some alternative scenarios. Alongside the
Greenbook, FOMC members receive the Bluebook (with a blue cover), which
adds some analysis of ﬁnancial and money market conditions and detailed pol-
icy alternatives based in large part on the Greenbook forecast. The Greenbooks
and Bluebooks of the most recent ﬁve years are kept conﬁdential by the Federal
Reserve. In this paper, we will be using Greenbook baselines from prior to the
ﬁve-year window to demonstrate the eﬃcacy of OPPs.
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model, although explorations of methods of this nature using other
large-scale models at the Board go back to the 1970s.2 The proce-
dure has subsequently been extended to versions of the FRB/US
model incorporating rational expectations in asset pricing. This pa-
per explains OPPs in terms of a generalization of the linear-quadratic
model of optimal policy with judgment and forward-looking variables
laid out in Svensson (2003) and (2005). It also demonstrates the fea-
sibility of using OPPs to help inform policymaking under the real-
world conditions faced by the Federal Reserve. We examine policy
options in early 1997 when the U.S. economy appeared to be reach-
ing capacity. We do this using two vintages of the FRB/US model
and two Greenbook baselines: the February 1997 Greenbook, when
the state of the world was unclear, and again with the November
1999 vintage and database, when there was a bit more clarity with
the beneﬁt of hindsight.3 Unbeknownst to the Board’s staﬀ at the
time, the economy in 1997 was in the early stages of a productivity
boom, a fact that was evident by 1999. Examining these two base-
lines and the models that were used at the time allows us to isolate
the inﬂuence of judgment on the OPP.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Following this
introduction, section 1 lays out the method of OPPs. Section 2 pro-
vides a real-world example. Section 3 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
1. The Method of Optimal Policy Projections
1.1 A Model of the Policy Problem with Judgment
The method of OPPs is for simplicity illustrated in a linear model
(FRB/US is a near-linear model). Consider the following linear
model of an economy, in a form that includes a role of judgment
and allows for both backward- and forward-looking elements,[
Xt+1
Cxt+1|t
]
= A
[
Xt
xt
]
+ Bit +
[
z1,t+1
z2,t
]
. (1)
2The early Federal Reserve work was pioneered by Peter Tinsley. See, in par-
ticular, Kalchbrenner and Tinsley (1976).
3Under the Federal Reserve’s information-security rules, the November 1999
Greenbook was the most recent one that was available to the public at the time
section 2 of this paper was prepared. The February 1997 forecast is extended
beyond the regular Greenbook range in a manner to be described.
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Here, Xt is an nX -vector of predetermined variables in period t;
xt is an nx-vector of forward-looking variables; it is an ni-vector
of instruments (the forward-looking variables and the instruments
are the nonpredetermined variables); z1t and z2t are exogenous
nX - and nx-vector stochastic processes, respectively; zt ≡ (z′1t, z′2t)′
is called the deviation in period t (′ denotes the transpose); A, B,
and C are matrices of the appropriate dimension; and yt+τ |t denotes
Etyt+τ for any variable yt, the rational expectation of yt+τ condi-
tional on information available in period t. The variables can be
measured as diﬀerences from steady-state values, in which case their
unconditional means are zero. Alternatively, one of the components
of Xt can be unity, so as to allow the variables to have nonzero
means.
The standard case of this problem is when z2,t ≡ 0 and z1,t
is a vector of iid zero-mean shocks. The new element here is that
zt, the deviation, is an arbitrary exogenous stochastic process. As
discussed in more detail in Svensson (2005), the deviation repre-
sents the diﬀerence between the model outcomes and the actual
realizations of data and includes all extra-model explanations of
the actual data. Below, the central bank’s judgment will be rep-
resented as the central bank’s projections of the future deviations.
This allows us to incorporate the fact that a considerable amount
of judgment is always applied to assumptions and projections.
Projections and monetary policy decisions cannot rely on models
and simple observable data alone. All models are drastic simpliﬁca-
tions of the economy, and data give a very imperfect view of the state
of the economy. Therefore, judgmental adjustments in both the use
of models and the interpretation of their results—adjustments due
to information, knowledge, and views outside the scope of any par-
ticular model—are a necessary and essential component in modern
monetary policy. The only restriction we shall impose below on the
stochastic process of the deviation is that the expected deviation is
constant (and, without loss of generality, zero) beyond a particular
horizon.
The upper block of (1) provides nX equations determining
the nX -vector Xt+1 in period t + 1 for given Xt, xt, it, and
z1,t+1,
Xt+1 = A11Xt + A12xt + B1it + z1,t+1,
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where A and B are decomposed according to
A ≡
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
]
, B =
[
B1
B2
]
. (2)
The lower block provides nx equations determining xt in period t for
given xt+1|t, Xt, it, and z2t,
xt = A−122 (Cxt+1|t −A21Xt −B2it − z2t);
we assume that the nx × nx submatrix A22 is invertible.
Let the Yt be an nY -vector of target variables, measured as the
diﬀerence from an nY -vector Y ∗ of target levels. This is not restric-
tive, as long as we keep the target levels time invariant.4 If we would
like to examine the consequences of diﬀerent target levels, we can
instead interpret Yt as the absolute level of the target levels and
replace Yt by Yt − Y ∗ everywhere below. Assume that the target
variables can be written as a linear function of the predetermined,
forward-looking, and instrument variables,
Yt = D

Xtxt
it

 , (3)
where D is an nY× (nX +nx +ni) matrix. Let the intertemporal loss
function in period t be
Et
∞∑
τ=0
δτ Y ′t+τWYt+τ , (4)
where 0 < δ < 1 is a discount factor and W is a symmetric positive
semideﬁnite matrix.
Let yt ≡ {yt+τ ,t}∞τ=0 denote a central-bank projection in period
t for any variable yt, a central-bank mean forecast conditional on
central-bank information in period t. As mentioned above, the pro-
jection of the deviation, zt ≡ {zt+τ ,t}∞τ=0, is identiﬁed with judgment.
4This restriction can be easily relaxed.
182 International Journal of Central Banking December 2005
For given judgment, zt, let the projection model of the central bank
for the projections (Xt, xt, it, Y t) in period t be[
Xt+τ+1,t
Cxt+τ+1,t
]
= A
[
Xt+τ ,t
xt+τ ,t
]
+ Bit+τ ,t +
[
z1,t+τ+1,t
z2,t+τ ,t
]
, (5)
Yt+τ ,t = D

Xt+τ ,txt+τ ,t
it+τ ,t

 (6)
for τ ≥ 0, where
Xt,t = Xt (7)
and Xt is given.
The policy problem in period t is to ﬁnd the optimal projection
(Xˆt, xˆt, ıˆt, Yˆ t), that is, the projection that minimizes the intertem-
poral loss function,
∞∑
τ=0
δτLt+τ ,t, (8)
where the period loss, Lt+τ ,t, is speciﬁed as
Lt+τ ,t = Yt+τ ,t′WYt+τ ,t. (9)
The minimization is subject to given Xt, zt, and (5) for τ ≥ 0.
For the policy problem in terms of projections, we can allow 0 <
δ ≤ 1, since the above inﬁnite sum will normally converge also for
δ = 1. The optimization is done under commitment in a “timeless
perspective”; however, we do not discuss here the details of how
the timeless perspective shall be implemented, but instead refer to
Svensson (2005).
Ideally, the implementation of the optimal policy in period t
would involve announcing the OPP, conditional on the judgments
of the monetary authority, and setting the instrument in period t
equal to the ﬁrst element of the instrument projection,
it = ıˆt,t.
Announcing the policy would serve to direct the expectations of a
possible skeptical public toward the goals of policy and over time
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provide a framework for the central bank to discuss the evolution
of its views. In period t + 1, a new OPP, (Xˆt+1, xˆt+1, ıˆt+1, Yˆ t+1), is
derived, conditional, once again, on Xt+1 and zt+1, and announced
together with a new instrument setting,
it+1 = ıˆt+1,t+1,
and so on.
1.2 Extracting Judgment
Consider a given reference projection (X˜t, x˜t, ı˜t), a projection
(X˜t, x˜t) conditional on ı˜t. This could be, for instance, a largely judg-
mental forecast for all relevant variables (X˜t, x˜t), conditional on a
particular federal-funds-rate projection ı˜t, or it could be a model-
based projection. Deﬁne the corresponding judgment, z˜t, as the pro-
jection (the projection of the future deviations) z˜t that fulﬁlls[
X˜t+τ+1,t
Cx˜t+τ+1,t
]
= A
[
X˜t+τ ,t
x˜t+τ ,t
]
+ Bı˜t+τ ,t +
[
z˜1,t+τ+1,t
z˜2,t+τ ,t
]
(10)
for τ ≥ 0. This is the judgment that makes the projection model
reproduce the reference projection. What “judgment” represents de-
pends on the context. In purely model-based forecasting, judgment is
the extra-model information that the central bank brings to bear on
the forecast. Judgment obviously depends on the model and on the
reference projection. The method of OPPs assumes that the dynam-
ics of the economy are adequately represented by the coeﬃcients
of the matrices A, B, and C, and that the relevant diﬀerence be-
tween the model and the economy can be adequately captured by
the judgment.5 However, this is not as restrictive as it might seem
on the surface. The method of OPPs involves overlaying a “policy
5An example might be the adjustments of forecasts done in 1999 due to the
Y2K phenomenon at the century’s end. Y2K is a particularly clean-cut example
because it was seemingly important, but since it had never happened before, no
model could be expected to encompass it. Notice that judgment can be attributed
to either the structural equations in the upper block of the system, or to beliefs,
or expectations, conditional on structure, as is the case in the lower block. Con-
tinuing with our Y2K example, there are the perfect-foresight implications of a
“destruction” of a part of the capital stock that Y2K represented; plus there are
the implications of people’s beliefs of a shock that no one had experienced before.
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round” on top of a baseline forecast, however produced. Two assump-
tions are required to make this operational: ﬁrst, that those aspects
of (5) that pertain to the monetary policy transmission mechanism
are consistent with the forecasters’ views; and second, that the judg-
ment itself, zt, can be taken as exogenous with respect to policy
actions. The ﬁrst of these assumptions means that, in principle, the
forecast could be carried out using a “model” that is very diﬀerent
from the model with which the OPP is to be conducted. The sec-
ond is a mild restriction, the prospective violation of which would
require the modelers to add the relevant equations to accommodate
the case. For example, forecasters could include judgment about the
existence of a stockmarket bubble but could not capture an assumed
direct eﬀect of policy on bursting the bubble without ﬁrst adding
equations to the model to capture this eﬀect.
This speciﬁcation assumes that the dimensions of the predeter-
mined variables, nonpredetermined variables, and instruments are
not less than the corresponding dimensions of the reference projec-
tion. If the dimension of the model is larger than the dimension of
the reference projection, the judgment will not be unique. Since the
FRB/US model is near-linear, the particular judgment chosen will
not be of ﬁrst-order importance for our results; the OPPs can be car-
ried out with any ﬁxed judgment. Alternatively, the judgment can
be chosen so as to minimize the norm (a measure of the size) of the
judgment, for instance. If the dimension of the model is smaller than
that of the reference projection, then it is possible that the model is
insuﬃcient to capture all the details of the forecast.
In the case of the FRB/US model, there are elements of the
Greenbook forecast that do not have direct analogues in the FRB/US
model. For example, aircraft production and automobile sales to con-
sumers are forecast in the staﬀ’s judgmental forecast but do not ap-
pear directly in the model; instead, the model judgments necessary
to replicate these are contained within the investment and consumer
durables equations, respectively. However, so long as the interest
elasticities of these equations are representative of the beliefs of the
policymaker, the OPP experiment will also be representative.
If the reference forecast includes all the variables in the projection
model, the judgment z˜t is unique, since z˜1,t+τ+1,t is given by the
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residuals of the upper block of (5),
z˜1,t+τ+1,t = X˜t+τ+1,t −A11X˜t+τ ,t −A12x˜t+τ ,t −B1ı˜t+τ ,t
for τ ≥ 0, and z˜2,t+τ ,t is given by the residuals of the lower block,
z˜2,t+τ ,t = Cx˜t+τ+1,t −A21X˜t+τ ,t −A22x˜t+τ ,t −B2ı˜t+τ ,t
for τ ≥ 0.
1.3 A Finite-Horizon Approximation
It is convenient to use a ﬁnite-horizon approximation to the above
inﬁnite-horizon projection model. The implementation below with
the FRB/US model will also use a ﬁnite-horizon approximation.
As explained in detail in Svensson (2005), under suitable assump-
tions, there is a convenient ﬁnite-horizon approximation of this pro-
jection model, an approximation that can be made arbitrarily accu-
rate by extending the horizon T . The ﬁrst assumption is that the
judgment is constant and, without loss of generality, zero beyond
some horizon T ,
zt+τ ,t = 0 (τ ≥ T ). (11)
The second assumption is that the optimal projection asymptotically
approaches a steady state. Assuming that the optimal projection
reaches the steady state in ﬁnite time is then an approximation that
is arbitrarily accurate if the horizon is suﬃciently long. Svensson
(2005) also notes that alternative assumptions can make the ﬁnite-
horizon projection model exact, also for relatively short horizons.
Let the (nX + nx + ni)-vector st = (X ′t, x′t, i′t)′ denote the state
of the economy in period t, and let st+τ ,t denote a projection
in period t of the state of the economy in period t + τ . Let st,
the projection of the (current and future) states of the economy,
denote the ﬁnite-dimensional (T + 1) × (nX + nx + ni)-vector
st ≡ (s′t,t, s′t+1,t, . . . , s′t+T,t)′. Similarly, let all projections yt for
y = X, x, i, and Y now denote the ﬁnite-dimensional vector
yt ≡ (y′t,t, y′t+1,t, . . . , y′t+T,t)′. Svensson (2005) shows that the ﬁnite-
horizon projection model can be written compactly as
Gst = gt, (12)
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where G is a (T + 1)(nX + nx) × (T + 1)(nX + nx + ni) matrix,
and gt is a (T +1)(nX +nx)-vector deﬁned as gt ≡ (Xt, z′1,t+1,t, z′2,t,t,
z′1,t+2,t, z′2,t+1,t, . . . , z′1,t+T,t, z
′
2,t+T−1,t, z
′
2,t+T,t)
′. Here, Xt denotes
the given vector of predetermined variables in period t.
Since Y t now denotes the ﬁnite-dimensional (T + 1)nY -vector
Y t ≡ (Y ′t,t, Y ′t+1,t, . . . , Y ′t+T,t)′, we can write
Y t = D˜st, (13)
where D˜ denotes a ﬁnite-dimensional (T+1)nY ×(T+1)(nX+nx+ni)
block-diagonal matrix with the matrix D in each diagonal block.
The intertemporal loss function can be written as a function of
st as the ﬁnite-dimensional quadratic form
1
2
st
′
Ωst, (14)
where Ω is a symmetric positive semideﬁnite block-diagonal
(T + 1)(nX + nx + ni) matrix with its (τ + 1)-th diagonal block
being δτD′WD for 0 ≤ τ ≤ T .6
Then, the policy problem is to ﬁnd the OPP sˆt that minimizes
(14) subject to (12). The Lagrangian for this problem is
1
2
st
′
Ωst + Λt
′
(Gst − gt), (15)
where Λt is the (T + 1)(nX + nx)-vector of Lagrange multipliers of
(12). The ﬁrst-order condition is
st
′
Ω+ Λt
′
G = 0.
Combining this with (12) gives the linear equation system[
G 0
Ω G′
][
st
Λt
]
=
[
gt
0
]
.
The solution to this linear system gives the OPP sˆt, which in turn
determines the OPP of the target variables, Yˆ t ≡ D˜sˆt. In particular,
the method of OPPs amounts to ﬁnding a whole projection path for
6Svensson (2005) shows how this loss function shall be modiﬁed to incorporate
commitment in a timeless perspective; we abstract from these issues here.
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the instrument and doing so in one step, as opposed to deriving an
instrument rule.7
A ﬁnite-dimensional projection model has several advantages be-
yond ease of computation. One is that it is very easy to incorporate
any restrictions on the projections. Any equality restriction on Xt,
xt, it, or Y t can be written
Rst = s¯t, (16)
where the number of rows of the matrix R and the dimension of
the given vector s¯t equal the number of restrictions. This makes it
easy to incorporate any restriction on the instrument projection—for
instance, that it shall be constant or of a particular shape for some
periods. Then it is possible to compute restricted OPPs, OPPs that
are subject to some restrictions, for particular purposes.
2. A Real-World Demonstration of OPPs
This section provides a real-world demonstration of OPPs, using the
FRB/US model.
2.1 The World in Early 1997
We use the economy in early 1997 as our backdrop. To illustrate the
importance of judgment, we use two diﬀerent views of the state of
the economy at that time. The ﬁrst is the contemporaneous view
from the February 1997 Greenbook forecast and the FRB/US model
of that time.8 The second is the “backcast” of this period as seen
from the November 1999 Greenbook.
The contemporaneous forecast of February 1997 was selected for
a number of reasons. First, in the view of the Federal Reserve Board’s
7Robustness can be addressed by looking at “distorted judgment” in a way
suggested by, for instance, Hansen and Sargent (2003 and forthcoming) and
Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001), through the addition of worst-case judg-
ment to the baseline forecast and optimizing conditional on that judgment. One
would, of course, consider such a scenario as part of a suite of scenarios, includ-
ing the OPP for the best-guess forecast, not as a replacement for the best-guess
forecast.
8We follow the convention internal to the Federal Reserve of dating the forecast
as of the date of the FOMC meeting. The Greenbook document corresponding to
the February decision—Federal Reserve Board (1997a)—was actually completed
in late January.
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Table 1. February 1997 Greenbook Forecast1
1995 1996 1997 1998
Real GDP 3.3 3.1 2.3 2.1
Unemployment rate2 5.6 5.3 5.1 5.0
Non-farm business productivity −0.1 0.8 0.8 0.8
PCE inﬂation 2.1 2.5 2.2 2.8
Employment cost index3 2.6 3.1 3.5 3.7
1. Four-quarter or twelve-month growth as applicable, except
as noted.
2. Monthly average value in the ﬁnal quarter of the year shown.
3. Private-industry workers, December–December.
staﬀ, the economy was straining at capacity constraints. According
to the Greenbook (Federal Reserve Board 1997a, part 1, I-2):
Labor markets, of course, are already tight, and the latest
statistics have conﬁrmed the uptilt in compensation in-
creases last year. With the unemployment rate projected
to edge down to 5 percent and with the minimum wage
jumping again later this year, we see labor cost inﬂa-
tion continuing to escalate . . . [O]ur forecast has edged
further in the direction of a more cyclical pattern of inﬂa-
tionary overshooting, which typically has been followed
by a period of weakness.
Real GDP growth in 1996 was measured at a bit over 3 percent
per year, well above most estimates of the growth rate of poten-
tial output.9 The unemployment rate, which had started 1996 at
5.6 percent, ﬁnished it at 5.3 percent, below most estimates of the
NAIRU. Meanwhile, growth in personal consumption expenditures
(PCE) prices was climbing, to 2.5 percent for the twelve months
ending December 1996, up from 2.1 percent a year earlier. Not sur-
prisingly, then, the staﬀ saw unsustainable growth, given a constant
federal funds rate, over the projection period ending in 1998:Q4.
Table 1 summarizes the emerging data of that time and the forecast.
9For example, the Congressional Budget Oﬃce was projecting potential output
growth in 1996 of about 2-1/4 percent, measured on a GDP basis (see Congres-
sional Budget Oﬃce 1997). See Orphanides and Williams (2002) for a detailed
examination of retrospective and real-time estimates of NAIRU measures.
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The projected wage-price spiral is evident in the sharp accelera-
tion in wage inﬂation (the employment cost index). And while pro-
ductivity growth had increased recently, it had only climbed from
dismal rates in 1995 to modest rates in 1996; similar modest rates
were projected into the future. The warning in the Greenbook’s state-
ment that tighter monetary policy was likely to be necessary was
also reﬂected in the Bluebook, the Federal Reserve staﬀ’s main doc-
ument for analyzing monetary policy options for the FOMC (Federal
Reserve Board 1997b, 6–7):
By the end of the Greenbook forecast, the disequilib-
rium in policy and in the economy has become quite
evident—the economy is producing beyond its sustain-
able potential and the stance of monetary policy is too
easy to correct the situation and forestall a continuous
rise in core inﬂation.
The second reason for selecting the February 1997 forecast is
that the judgment contained therein would turn out to be wrong:
unbeknownst to the Board’s staﬀ, a productivity boom was under
way in the United States that would obviate the need for a tight-
ening of monetary policy, at least for a while. The staﬀ and the
Committee were aware that productivity had been unusually high in
1996, but the staﬀ took the recent data to have been a temporary
phenomenon.10 Over the next year, the persistence of productivity
growth became evident, and the staﬀ consequently revised its fore-
cast. Accordingly, the view expressed in the November 1999 Green-
book was quite diﬀerent (Federal Reserve Board 1999, part 1, I-1):
The key changes in our forecast relate to a revised outlook
for labor productivity . . . [T]he combination of revisions
to the NIPA [National Income and Product Accounts]
and a reassessment of the contribution to potential out-
put from growth of the capital stock has led us to raise
our estimate of trend growth in recent years and . . . in
the period ahead.
10Still, there was enough evidence of something going on that the staﬀ included
some alternative scenarios in the Bluebook to illustrate the possibility that higher
productivity growth might persist.
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The upward revision to the estimates of past and projected trend
growth meant substantially less incipient inﬂation pressures than
had previously been anticipated. For our purposes, this sets up an
interesting contrast of what the policy prescription would have been
in real time with what it would have been in retrospect, nearly three
years later.
2.2 The Greenbook Extension
Using the February 1997 Greenbook provides a third advantage: it
was the ﬁrst Greenbook that was extended beyond its normal fore-
cast period to provide a baseline for policy analysis experiments in
the Bluebook. (The extension procedure would become routine some-
what later.) And while the extension of that time was not stored
electronically, the Bluebook document oﬀers guidance on how to
reconstruct the original extension. We do this for this paper. Re-
producing the extension, in turn, has two beneﬁts. First, it provides
a reasonably lengthy period in common with the November 1999
Greenbook—the period from 1997:Q1 to 2001:Q4—that we can use
to compare OPP experiments, with and without the beneﬁt of some
hindsight. Second, it demonstrates the procedure in use at the Fed-
eral Reserve Board for creating extensions and the judgment encom-
passed therein.
Good judgment is of obvious beneﬁt for policy design. For us,
however, the veracity of the judgment at the time is less important
than demonstrating its signiﬁcance to OPPs in general, and the dif-
ferences from alternative policies, in particular.
The Greenbook forecast is conditioned on an assumed path for
the federal funds rate, the Federal Reserve’s policy instrument. Fol-
lowing the convention of the day, the February 1997 Greenbook held
ﬁxed the funds rate at the prevailing value of 5-1/4 percent until the
end of the forecast period in 1998:Q4. This gave the Committee a
sense of what a “no-change policy” would imply.
In all cases, the Greenbook extension maintains all the assump-
tions of the Greenbook forecast itself for the forecast period. This
is done by computing the judgment—that is, the residuals to the
FRB/US model—that is necessary to replicate the Greenbook fore-
cast. Thereafter, the fundamental views of the forecast are main-
tained wherever possible by extending several years into the future
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the model residuals as of the end of the regular forecast period.
In principle, any assumptions regarding the economic outlook could
have been incorporated in the extension by adjusting the model resid-
uals and exogenous variables in an appropriate way over the exten-
sion period. But the staﬀ have tended to focus on determinants of
the medium-term outlook, including the stance of ﬁscal policy, for-
eign economic conditions, oil prices, productivity growth, and the
exchange rate.
The medium-term outlook also included a view on the general
state of the economy and what that state implies for monetary pol-
icy.11 As noted, the view in early 1997 was that the economy had
reached an unsustainable level of output with incipient inﬂation pres-
sures. For the extension, this elicited an increase in the funds rate
to stabilize the economy and contain inﬂation, albeit not necessar-
ily at an inﬂation rate that FOMC members would ﬁnd desirable.
Risks in the forecast and its extension can be (and were) handled
by reconstructing baseline forecasts with alternative assumptions
and recomputing policy scenarios conditional on the alternative
baseline.
We will have more to say about the extension and its properties
in the next section. We close this subsection by noting that since the
funds rate path in the extension is not likely to be optimal, in the
OPP exercises below we should expect to see a markedly diﬀerent
path. To provide some context, we will also include some scenarios
with funds rate settings directed by a simple Taylor rule, just as in
Taylor (1993), except that core PCE inﬂation is used instead of the
GDP price deﬂator. Besides being simple and familiar, the Taylor
rule was and is held up as an example of an instrument rule that,
although not necessarily optimal, should work reasonably well in
a wide variety of circumstances. Moreover, in accordance with the
real-time nature of the present analysis, in early 1997 the rule was
novel and was garnering a great deal of attention.
11Except where extra-model information would suggest otherwise, variables
that have typically exhibited trends in history are extrapolated out at trend
rates in the extension period. Variables that have been stationary are assumed
to settle on values at or near their forecast ending values except when stabilizing
on such values would be inconsistent with the views incorporated in the forecast.
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2.3 The FRB/US Model
The FRB/US model is the workhorse model of the Federal Re-
serve Board’s staﬀ. As such, it serves in a variety of capacities:
conducting forecasts, carrying out policy experiments, generating al-
ternative Greenbook simulations, conducting stochastic simulations
to measure uncertainty, and constructing the Greenbook extension,
to name a few. And while the model is not used to produce the
oﬃcial Greenbook forecast—that is done judgmentally—the model
provides a check on the Greenbook forecast, both formally through
the model forecasts themselves, and informally through explorations
of the model’s properties and examinations of the Greenbook
extension.12
Fundamentally, the model is of New Keynesian design. It includes
a speciﬁc expectations block and, with it, a fundamental distinction
between intrinsic model dynamics (dynamics that are immutable
to policy) and expectational dynamics (which policy can aﬀect). In
most instances, the intrinsic dynamics of the model were designed
around representative agents choosing optimal paths for decision
variables while facing polynomial adjustment costs. The notion of
polynomial adjustment costs, a straightforward generalization of the
well-known quadratic adjustment costs, allowed, for example, the
ﬂow of investment to be costly to adjust, and not just the capital
stock. This idea, controversial at the time, has recently been adopted
in the broader academic community.13
The model has a neoclassical steady state with growth and rich
channels through which monetary policy operates. Monetary im-
pulses originate from the model’s instrument, the federal funds rate,
and then transmit—in large part through expectations—to longer-
term interest rates, asset prices, and wealth, and from there to ex-
penditure decisions of ﬁrms and consumers. The model is estimated
using NIPA data, with most equations estimated over the period
since the early 1960s.
12The Greenbook extension provides a path for the funds rate beyond the
Greenbook forecast period that is used to inform the path for longer-term bond
rates that condition the Greenbook forecast.
13Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), for example, allow the ﬂow of
investment to be costly to adjust, which is the same thing as having higher-order
adjustment costs for the stock of capital.
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FRB/US is a large model. In 1997, it contained some 300 equa-
tions and identities, of which perhaps 50 were behavioral. About half
of the behavioral equations of that vintage of the model were mod-
eled using formal speciﬁcations of optimizing behavior containing
explicit estimates of forward expectations and adjustment costs.14
Two versions of expectations formation were envisioned: ratio-
nal expectations and VAR-based expectations. Rational expectations
means that agents are assumed to understand and take fully into ac-
count the entire structure of the model, including monetary policy
formulation, in arriving at their decisions. VAR-based expectations
follows a parable quite like the Phelps-Lucas “island paradigm”: the
model’s agents live on diﬀerent islands where they have access to a
limited set of core macroeconomic variables, knowledge they share
with everyone in the economy. The core macroeconomic variables
are the output gap, the inﬂation rate, and the federal funds rate,
as well as beliefs on the long-run target rate of inﬂation and what
the equilibrium real rate of interest will be in the long run. In addi-
tion, they have information that is germane to their island, or sector.
Consumers, for example, augment their core VAR model with infor-
mation about potential output growth and the ratio of household
income to GDP.
There is not the space here for a complete description of the
model. Readers interested in detailed descriptions of the model are
invited to consult papers on the subject, including Brayton and
Tinsley (1996), Brayton, Levin, et al. (1997), Brayton, Mauskopf,
et al. (1997), and Reifschneider, Tetlow, and Williams (1999). Tetlow
and Ironside (2004) describe the real-time evolution of the model and
the time variation in optimized Taylor-type rules that are implied.
The FRB/US model is a near-linear model. The illustrative lin-
ear (or linearized) framework used above to explain OPPs can thus
be seen as a good linear approximation to the FRB/US model. The
model is solved using a terminal condition that projections of the
variables are equal to their target or steady-state values at a given
horizon T . Thus, the FRB/US model is solved as a ﬁnite-horizon
problem. This is a practical step, and it is not restrictive for OPP
purposes. Optimal policy in the FRB/US model makes all variables
14In price and volume decisions, polynomial adjustment costs ruled. In ﬁnancial
markets, intrinsic adjustment costs were assumed to be zero.
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approach their target or steady-state values at suﬃciently long hori-
zons. Then, the horizon T can be set to a reasonably large number
such that the ﬁnite-horizon solution is insensitive to local perturba-
tions of the terminal date.15 The ﬁnite-horizon approximation out-
lined above can then be seen as a linearization of the ﬁnite-horizon
problem for the FRB/US model. Indeed, the near-linear FRB/US
model can be represented as a near-linear equation system instead
of (12),
f(st, gt) = 0, (17)
where the function f(·, ·) is a vector-valued function of dimension
(T +1)(nX +nx). The OPP is then the projection st that minimizes
(14) subject to (17).
OPPs can and have been done with both VAR-based- and
rational-expectations versions of the model. An important point to
glean from these examples is that in comparison with most models,
the various versions and vintages of the FRB/US model are compli-
cated. It follows that if the method of OPPs can work for this model
under these circumstances, it can work for a wide variety of other
applications.
In what follows in this paper, we restrict the analysis to the
version with VAR-based expectations, in large part because this is
what was used almost exclusively for Greenbook and Bluebook work
in 1997. Today, it is still the VAR-based-expectations version of the
model that is used for forecasting. For policy analysis, when the staﬀ
believes the experiment in question does not deviate too much from
what has been typical in the past, so that the average historical expe-
rience captured in the VAR can be thought of as representative of the
likely response under the experiment, the VAR-based-expectations
version is again used. The rational-expectations version is used for
problems in which agents are likely to have the information and moti-
vation to formulate a detailed understanding of events, or for policies
that are systematic enough that agents could be expected to learn
about their consequences.16
15That is, one need only extend the horizon until such a point that the extension
no longer aﬀects the simulated results over the horizon of interest. This is a “type
III iteration” in the parlance of Fair and Taylor (1983).
16Examples of where foresight is regarded as critical include certain kinds of
ﬁscal-policy interventions, since they involve legislative commitments to future
actions that are costly to undo and for which it pays for agents to make the eﬀort
Vol. 1 No. 3 Optimal Policy Projections 195
2.4 Two OPPs
In designing OPPs in the present context, one is faced with choices
regarding the speciﬁcation of the loss function, (9), which amounts to
ﬁxing weights in the matrices W and Ω and targets for the inﬂation
rate and the unemployment rate. One could, in principle, choose the
weights on the loss function using a quadratic approximation of the
true social welfare function, as described in Woodford (2003). How-
ever, this would be prohibitively diﬃcult to do in a model as large
and as complicated as the FRB/US model. Moreover, as Levin and
Williams (2003) have argued, leveraging the microfoundations of a
model in this way can make the selected policy even more suscepti-
ble to model uncertainty than would otherwise be the case. For this
exercise we choose equal weights on each of the (squared) deviation
of inﬂation from its target rate (the inﬂation gap), the deviation of
the unemployment rate from the estimated NAIRU (the unemploy-
ment gap), and the change in the federal funds rate.17 The target for
the unemployment rate is set equal to the staﬀ estimate of NAIRU
at the time of 5.6 percent. The choice of a target rate of inﬂation
is more problematic. The Federal Reserve does not have an oﬃcial
target rate of inﬂation. As we show below, while the judgmental path
for the federal funds rate in the extension period was chosen with
some notion of stabilizing the economy in mind, it was not done so
to render “price stability.” Under these circumstances, we arbitrarily
choose a rate of 2 percent, measured in terms of PCE inﬂation, for
the target rate.18 Hence this corresponds to a periodic loss function,
Lt+τ ,t = (πt+τ ,t−π∗)2 +(ut+τ ,t−u∗t+τ ,t)2 +(it+τ ,t− it+τ−1,t)2, (18)
to learn the implications of the legislation. Another example would be monetary
policy rules that are used so systematically that agents can be expected to learn
them.
17The presence in the loss function of the inﬂation rate less its target rate and
the unemployment rate less the NAIRU (or the output gap) is conventional. The
use of the change in the funds rate as an argument to the loss function is a simple
acknowledgement of the empirical observation that central banks the world over
seem to smooth instrument settings over time. This phenomenon may represent
eﬀorts to hedge against model uncertainty, an inherent taste of central bankers,
or something else. See Sack and Wieland (2000) for a survey on Federal Reserve
interest-rate smoothing.
18Besides being a reasonable, mainstream choice, as we shall see, a 2 percent
target corresponds with a scenario called “stable inﬂation” in the Bluebook.
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where πt denotes annualized quarterly PCE inﬂation in quarter t,
measured in percent, the inﬂation target π∗ equals 2 percent per
year, ut denotes the unemployment rate measured in percent, and
u∗t denotes the natural unemployment rate. The discount factor in
the intertemporal loss function is set at δ = 0.99 per quarter.
The same exercise is carried out based on the November 1999
Greenbook, using the baseline of that time, and that model vintage.
Now, since part of the period we study has us looking back at the
1997 to 1999 period, the “judgment” is quite diﬀerent. In the inter-
vening years, the staﬀ had come to recognize the productivity boom
during the mid-1990s. In addition, myriad other forces had impinged
on the economy, including the 1998 Asian crisis and the Russian
debt default. The policymaker’s loss function also diﬀers, albeit only
slightly: in the nearly three years between the two Greenbooks under
study, the staﬀ reduces its estimate of the NAIRU, u∗t , to 5.2 percent
instead of the previous 5.6 percent. Accordingly, it is the lower ﬁgure
that enters into equation (18) for the November 1999 exercise.
The results are best shown graphically, which we do in ﬁgure 1.
The left column of the ﬁgure shows the results for the February
1997 Greenbook, while the right column shows the results for the
November 1999 Greenbook. In each case, the baseline projection
is shown by the solid line, the OPP is the dashed line, and the
Taylor-rule projection is the dashed-dotted line. A vertical line marks
1996:Q4, the last quarter before our projections. Let us focus on the
left column for the time being.
As already discussed, the February 1997 Greenbook baseline pro-
jection holds the funds rate at its inherited level until the conclusion
of the forecast period in 1998:Q4; thereafter the funds rate path was
adjusted judgmentally to contain excess demand and stabilize the
inﬂation rate. In particular, the funds rate rises 50 basis points in
each of the ﬁrst three quarters of 1999 to reach 6-3/4 percent, where
it stays until the end of 2000. Thereafter, the funds rate is reduced
to 6-1/4 percent, where it remains for the duration of the scenario.
With these increases in the funds rate coming as late as they do, the
middle-left panel shows a near-continuous decline in the unemploy-
ment rate under the baseline policy until mid-1999, after which time
it gradually returns to the staﬀ NAIRU of 5.6 percent. And, the staﬀ
warned in the Greenbook of the time, the result is a steady rise in
inﬂation rate, to about 3.3 percent.
Vol. 1 No. 3 Optimal Policy Projections 197
Figure 1. Optimal Policy Projections with the FRB/US
Model (Selected Historical Extended
Greenbook Forecasts)
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The OPP calls for an immediate increase in the funds rate, by
about 125 basis points over the ﬁrst three quarters of 1997, and
reaches its peak of a little over 6-1/2 percent in early 1998. There-
after, it slides slowly back down toward its original level. These in-
creases in the funds rate are suﬃcient to reverse the decline in unem-
ployment that would otherwise be projected to occur, bringing the
unemployment rate above the NAIRU by the middle of 1998. The
prescribed increases in the funds rate, while not particularly large
by historical standards, are timely. By acting early, the OPP keeps
inﬂation very close to the target rate of 2 percent, as shown in the
bottom-left panel.
The OPP simpliﬁes the construction of, and adds rigor to, the
process that was actually carried out for the February 1997 Blue-
book. The appendix to this paper shows selected pages from that
Bluebook. The dotted line in the appendix chart shows a path for
the funds rate, determined by trial-and-error methods, that brings
core PCE inﬂation to the same 2 percent target level we use in OPP.
The path for the funds rate shown there shows broadly the same
characteristics as the OPP path, although the path is not an opti-
mal one.
Returning to ﬁgure 1, in order to provide some context, the
dashed-dotted lines show projections under the Taylor rule.19 By
construction, a Taylor-rule policy responds to the big picture of the
economy, but eschews the judgment that is the subject of this pa-
per. Thus, it is useful for comparative purposes. The dashed-dotted
line in the upper-left panel shows that the Taylor rule calls for an
even sharper tightening of policy in the short run than does the
OPP policy. Thereafter, it advocates a more equivocal policy for
some time, with oscillations up and down in the funds rate. This
reﬂects the myopic nature of the rule—picking the funds rate pe-
riod by period based only on current conditions—as opposed to the
multiperiod forward-looking optimal planning of OPPs. Thus, the
Taylor rule must reverse what turn out to be excessive movements
in previous settings of the funds rate. In the end, the Taylor rule’s
policy prescription ends up with unemployment and inﬂation that
19For the Taylor-rule simulation, the equilibrium real federal funds rate, r∗, is
set equal to 3.1 percent, the value that the real rate converges on in the extension
shown in the baseline simulation as shown in the upper-right panel of the chart
in the appendix.
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are closer to target than the baseline policy, but still well oﬀ target
levels.
Now let us turn to the November 1999 baseline shown in the right
column. It is obviously not possible for a policymaker acting in real
time to have the scope of information that the November 1999 back-
cast of the period from 1997:Q1 to 1999:Q3 includes. Our objective
here is diagnostic; we revisit this period in history to see what better
judgment—as captured by the historical data and the backcast of un-
observable variables that those data engendered—does to policy pre-
scriptions. The solid line, once again, shows the forecast (for 1999:Q4
and beyond) as well as the revised historical data (from 1997:Q1 to
1999:Q3). Notice the dip in the funds rate, in the upper-right panel,
from late 1998 until early 2000, reﬂecting the FOMC’s response to
the Asia crisis and its eﬀects on global ﬁnancial markets.20 Beginning
as before in 1997:Q1, the actual funds rate rose 25 basis points early
in 1997. With the beneﬁt of hindsight, the OPP would have called
for a modest easing in the stance of policy in the early going. The
subsequent increases in the funds rate, although superﬁcially simi-
lar to those for the February 1997 scenario, are smaller and shorter
lived. In any event, one of the interesting historical aspects of the two
baseline scenarios is the remarkable diﬀerence in inﬂation projections
that are supported by relatively similar patterns of excess demand
as captured by the unemployment rates. This change in view was a
reﬂection of the new-found appreciation by the staﬀ of the produc-
tivity boom and its eﬀects on marginal costs and hence on inﬂation.
In the end, this results in a situation—as seen from the perspective
of the November 1999 Greenbook—in which excess demand for labor
must be tolerated for a time in order to bring inﬂation up toward
the target of 2 percent from the low levels seen in 1997 and 1998.
The Taylor rule is oblivious to all this. It responds only to con-
temporaneous excess demand (which diﬀers only in small ways in
early 1997 between the two scenarios) and inﬂation (which diﬀers
even less). Consequently, the policy prescription from the Taylor
rule is quite similar for the two baselines, even though they diﬀer
20In daily data, the intended funds rate would move in 25 basis points incre-
ments, given the FOMC’s practice to move it in such discrete increments. Histor-
ically, however, the Federal Reserve was not always able to keep the funds rate
at its intended level. And, in any case, in our ﬁgures the funds rate is expressed
as a quarterly average of daily observations.
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Table 2. Losses Under Alternative Funds Rate Paths1
February 1997 November 1999
Loss Incr.2 Loss Incr.2
OPP policy 0.20 – 1.69 –
Taylor rule 0.66 0.46 2.27 0.58
Extended Greenbook 1.06 0.86 2.28 0.59
1. Losses calculated from 1997:Q1 to 2001:Q4, average per quarter.
2. Increase in loss compared with the OPP.
in important ways. The myopia of the Taylor rule causes it to oscil-
late back and forth between tightening and easing in the November
1999 baseline.
To provide a summing up of the performance of these rules,
table 2 computes the loss as calculated using (14) and (18), for the
baseline projection and the two counterfactual experiments, for both
the February 1997 and November 1999 cases. In all cases the losses
are computed over the same period of twenty quarters from 1997:Q1
to 2001:Q4 and divided by the number of quarters, so the losses
reported are average loss measured per quarter. To add some per-
spective, the columns marked “Incr.” show the increase in loss com-
pared with the OPP loss, which can be interpreted as the maximum
increase in the average (per quarter) squared inﬂation gap, unem-
ployment gap, or federal funds change, that the policymaker would
be willing to incur for the privilege of using the OPP policy instead
of the policy shown.21
The two left columns show the results for the February 1997
model. They demonstrate that both the baseline and the Taylor-rule
projections produce substantially inferior performance, in propor-
tionate terms, in comparison with the OPP. In both cases, the poli-
cymaker would be willing to suﬀer an increase in the average squared
inﬂation gap of about a half percentage point per period or more for
the privilege of using the OPP. The result under the baseline pro-
jection is hardly surprising, since the path for the funds rate in that
instance is a conditioning assumption for the forecast, rather than a
21It is because each squared term of the loss function carries the same weight
that the increase in loss applies to all terms.
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policy prescription—but the Taylor-rule result requires some expla-
nation. What it tells us is that the Taylor rule supplies the broad
strokes of a stabilizing policy, but in a large-scale model where there
are numerous channels through which shocks are conveyed and pol-
icy operates, it provides insuﬃcient breadth to come close to the
optimal policy. Advocates of simple rules recognize that such rules
are suboptimal (except in special cases) to a complexity of a fully op-
timal rule. The trade-oﬀ for this suboptimality is said to be that such
rules are likely to be more robust than many alternatives, a point to
which we return presently. Our result for the February 1997 model,
however, suggests that the Taylor rule leaves substantial room for
improvement.
The two right columns show the results for the November 1999
model. In this case, the baseline projection is littered with the actual
shocks borne over the period from 1997 to 1999. Even with optimal
feedback in response to these shocks, signiﬁcant losses are incurred
and so the performances under the alternative projections are likely
to be more similar than in our previous case. The results here show
that the OPP, operating with the advantage of hindsight over the
1997–99 period, would have outperformed by a signiﬁcant margin
the performance of the Taylor rule or the baseline funds rate path.
The foregoing shows the importance of judgment for the design
of policy. It also shows that diﬀerent judgments can lead to diﬀerent
policies. The question of robustness of policy logically arises. If judg-
ment can be suspect, it stands to reason that diﬀerent OPPs should
be conducted for diﬀerent, plausible sets of judgment. OPPs for alter-
native assumptions—including, in the context of these experiments,
increasing productivity growth and falling natural unemployment
rates, as well as for alternative weights in the loss function—can eas-
ily be computed. Together, these alternative OPPs along with the
baseline projection can comprise a useful portfolio of policy alterna-
tives for central bankers.
3. Conclusions
This paper shows in theory and in practice how judgment can be
optimally incorporated into a rigorous process for monetary policy
decision making. The method of optimal policy projections has the
advantage of fully incorporating all the knowledge and views that
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can be formalized of monetary policy decision makers. This method is
already in use by the staﬀ of the Federal Reserve Board for presenting
policy options to the Federal Open Market Committee.
We demonstrate the eﬃcacy of OPPs using two historical base-
lines and two vintages of the Federal Reserve Board’s FRB/US
model. To us, the results are encouraging. Moreover, we would ar-
gue that the Federal Reserve’s continued use of such exercises—
complicated as it is by the use of a large-scale model that is diﬀerent
from the “model” with which the forecast is generated—shows that
OPPs are a viable tool for many central banks.
Looking to the future, an important limitation of the procedure
is the certainty-equivalence assumption for the results and the conse-
quent underplaying of model-uncertainty issues other than additive
judgmental adjustments. The paper mentions the possibility of com-
puting multiple OPPs associated with diﬀering sets of judgments.
Also mentioned is the use of min-max procedures in combination
with OPPs to formulate defensive strategies against locally worst-
case outcomes. These should be worthwhile avenues to pursue. An-
other possible extension is to show how OPPs can be updated over
real time as new data are collected and new judgment is adopted.
Appendix. Excerpt from the February 1997 Bluebook
Long-Run Scenarios
(6) To provide a longer-run perspective on the strategic issues con-
fronting the Committee, this section presents econometric model
simulations designed to examine alternative monetary policies as well
as the eﬀects of certain shocks to the economy. The three policy sce-
narios considered ﬁrst are built around the Greenbook forecast, using
the staﬀ’s new macroeconometric model to extend that forecast and
to derive diﬀerences resulting from alternative policies. These scenar-
ios incorporate the same assumptions regarding underlying macroe-
conomic factors; notably, the full-employment budget for the federal
government is on path to balance by early in the next century and
the NAIRU is 5.6 percent. Other sets of scenarios consider: (1) a fa-
vorable shock to productivity growth, (2) an increase in the NAIRU,
and (3) a signiﬁcant decline in the stock market. The model’s dy-
namic properties are importantly aﬀected by the level and changes
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in the public’s expectations about key economic variables—such as
the rate of inﬂation likely to prevail in the long run. Because these
expectations adapt slowly and nominal wages adjust sluggishly, the
sacriﬁce ratio over a period of ﬁve years is about 2—in line with the
historical average for the U.S. economy. That is, reducing inﬂation
by 1 percentage point requires unemployment to exceed the NAIRU
by the equivalent of 1 percentage point for two years.
(7) The baseline strategy, shown by the solid lines in Chart 2, is
an extension of the Greenbook forecast. By the end of the Greenbook
forecast, the disequilibrium in policy and the economy has become
quite evident—the economy is producing beyond its sustainable po-
tential and the stance of policy is too easy to correct the situation
and forestall a continuous rise in core inﬂation.4 Under the baseline
strategy, the Committee caps the rise in inﬂation by tightening pol-
icy after 1998 by enough to bring the unemployment rate quickly
up to the NAIRU. This requires the federal funds rate to be raised
by around 1-1/2 percentage points, so that the real funds rate over-
shoots its equilibrium for a time.5 With this strategy, the Commit-
tee would accept whatever rate of inﬂation that developed while the
economy was operating beyond its potential, and, as a consequence,
core PCE inﬂation would ratchet up from an average of 2 to 2-1/2
percent in recent years to a little over 3 percent.
(8) Some pickup in core inﬂation appears to be unavoidable in
the near term given the staﬀ’s assessment of the cyclical position of
the economy, but the stable inﬂation strategy limits that rise and
4In the charts, inﬂation is measured by the core PCE chain-weight price index,
and past movements in this index are used to proxy for inﬂation expectations in
calculations of the real funds rate. This index has a steeper upward trajectory
over the next few years than do many other broad measures of prices, because
it: (1) excludes food and energy prices, which are moderating; (2) is unaﬀected
by the changes in BLS calculations of the CPI; and (3) unlike a broad GDP
price measure, includes import prices, which are damped at ﬁrst and boosted
later by the actual and assumed gyrations of the dollar. We think it gives a
clearer view of the underlying inﬂation tendencies in the various scenarios, but
its application in calculating the real interest rate may exaggerate the projected
drop in real rates in 1997 and 1998, especially if the public forms its expectations
based on a broader set of prices than in this core measure. The real funds rates
shown in the charts are higher than those calculated using the CPI, but would be
higher through history as well because inﬂation as measured by the PCE index
on average has run 1
2
percentage point below the CPI.
5That equilibrium itself is lower toward the end of the simulation than at
present owing primarily to additional ﬁscal consolidation.
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1. The real federal funds rate is calculated as the quarterly nominal funds
rate minus the four-quarter percent change in the PCE chain-weight price
index excluding food and energy.
Note: Data points are plotted at the midpoint of each period.
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ultimately brings inﬂation back down to around its recently prevail-
ing rate. This entails a near-term tightening, with the nominal funds
rate rising to 6-1/2 percent by the end of 1998. The eﬀects of the
unemployment rate remaining below the NAIRU until early 1999
are tempered in the near term by the sharp slowing in real growth,
which keeps inﬂation expectations damped in the model (similar in
result to a “speed eﬀect” in the Phillips curve), and by the rise in the
dollar associated with higher interest rates. These eﬀects dissipate,
however, and ultimately the real interest rate and the unemploy-
ment rate must be kept above their natural levels for some time to
oﬀset the underlying inﬂationary pressures built up as the economy
operated above potential from 1996 through 1998.
(9) A strategy involving a sharper tightening of policy over the
next two years, with the nominal funds rate rising soon and reach-
ing 7 percent in late 1998, would achieve price stability in seven
years or so. In this scenario, a higher real funds rate is sustained for
longer than under the stable inﬂation strategy to produce enough
slack in the economy to keep downward pressures on wages and
prices. The sizable output loss reﬂects the slow adaptation of ex-
pectations noted above. In the absence of empirical evidence that
the cost of disinﬂation from moderate levels is reduced by an ag-
gressive anti-inﬂation program or by announced inﬂation targets, we
have included no special “credibility” eﬀects from the Committee em-
barking on a deliberate strategy to achieve price stability. Credibil-
ity for price stability does develop—but “in the old fashioned way,”
by earning it through achieving stable prices. This simulation also
makes no allowance for enhanced productivity as price stability is
approached.
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